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Tiie purpose of this research was to develop a new experimental 
methodology as a ~on-reactive measure of group properties. Specifically, 
the research investigated group member status position as a function 
of judgments of performance by individual group members under various 
conditions of group solidarity •. Subjects judged their own and others.' 
performances in an unstructured stimulus situation utilizing a game 
derivative of baseball. Judgmental errors occurred with regard to 
group member's performances. Tiie empirical investigation of the 
relationship of these judgmental errors to relevant aspects of 
group structure and solidarity were the intended task of this research. 
Tiie scoring of performances in games as indices of group properties 
has been demonstrated by Harvey (1953), by Sherif, Harvey, White, 
Hood, and Sherif (1961), by MacNeil (1967), and by Davis (1970). 
'rhe present research extended this literature by providing a new 
methodology for the non-reactive measure of group properties. Scarcity 
of non-reactive measures of group properties in the social sciences 
mandated such research. 
Assumptions and Guidelines 
Research utilizing natural groups is limited to a great extent 
by the unavailability of large numbers of subjects and by the restricted 
1 
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range of sampling. The experimenter is limited to groups already 
established, or he must generate experimental groups. Matching across 
groups entails complex problems due to the lack of identical groups. 
Restrictions such as these limit inferences made from the obtained 
results. 
The present study acknowledges that an individual's perception 
must be inferred from his behavior (judgment). Therefore, the 
perception of a stimulus situation inferred from judgments, with 
respect to various group properties, is the focus of this research. 
Operational Definitions 
High groupness groups ..Q!l are those aggregates of individuals 
who, from their disguised sociogram responses, exemplified a high 
number of similar choices primarily on the first two questions 
(Appendix A). Group members also indicated spending much time 
together in many activities, and reflected much group interaction 
and a limited pattern of effective initiative over members. 
Low groupness groups J.!l are groups who from their disguised 
sociogram responses, exemplified a moderate number of similar choices, 
primarily on the first two questions. Group members also indicated 
spending some time together in a limited number of activities, and 
reflected a few examples of group interaction and a limited pattern 
of effective initiative over members. 
Nongroup aggregates ..QLl. are those units of individuals who, 
from their disguised sociogram responses, exemplified a complete lack 
of similar choices primarily on the first two questions with other 
aggregate members. 
Effective initiative is the assigned position in the rank 
ordering of members obtained by considering responses to question 
number two on the disguised sociogram. 
Status is each group member's position (rank) in a hierarchy 
of power relations in a social unit as measured by the relative 
effectiveness of initiative to control interaction, decision-making, 
and activities. It is operationally defined by the disguised 
sociogram response to question two, which deals primarily with 
effective initiative. As a dimension of role relations, status is 
not applicable to individuals in a nongroup aggregate. 
The objective score is the actual score obtained in the sociogame 
performance determined by recording the location of hits on the 
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target by the experimenter. These scores are not known to the subjects. 
The judgment score is the number assigned to each particular throw 
of an individual by every participating member including the thrower. 
Judgmental accuracy refers to the rank ordering of group 
or nongroup aggregate judgments obtained by adding all deviations 
from the actual scoreeand dividing by the total number of group or 
nongroup aggregate members. 
The judgmental~ is the numerical judgmental departure 
from objective reality, obtained by subtracting the objective score 
from the judgment score. 
~ judgmental rank is the assigned position in the rank 
ordering of members obtained by considering both the direction 
and magnitude of judgmental errors. 
Sociogame Behavior 
Group behavior studies found in the work of Harvey (1953), 
MacNeil (1967), and Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961) 
utilized systematic variations in judgment as measurable elements of 
an individual's behavior. Inferences were then made to variables 
pertaining to the group. 
The subjects' participation in a social stimulus situation 
provided the setting in which these behaviors occurred. The term 
"sociogame", coined by Davis (1970), provide~ simplicity and utility 
in expressing commonalities of research methodologies in the 
investigation of social and behavioral variables. 
A sociogame, then, is an experimental social 
stimulus situation of competitive or recreational 
context, employed to elicit quantifiable elements 
of behavior, usually judgments of stimuli of a 
relatively low degree of objective structure, for 
the purpose of studying group related behavioral 
variables (Davis, 1970, p. 2). 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The following discussion looks at the terms natural and 
experimental groups, conformity, roles, status, and groupness, 
respectively, with a primary focus on a single theory. The terms 
are examined because of their potential influences on the dependent 
variable, judgments, and examined with a primary focus on the 
Sherifian viewpoint because of its ease in relating to the present 
methodology. 
Clarification of Terms 
Natural and Experimental Groups 
According to Sherif and Sherif (1969), 
A group is a social unit consisting of a .. number -
of individuals who stand in role and status 
relationships to one another, stabilized in some 
degree at the time, and who possess a set of 
values or norms of their own regulating their 
behavior, at least in matters of consequence to 
the group (p. 131). 
However, with this definition no distinction is made between 
"natural" groups and "ad hoc" formal groups. To compensate for this 
imprecision, the experimenter offers the following. Natural groups 
differ from experimental groups in their formation, purpose, and 
member selection. Natural groups form spontaneously, serve primarily 
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the needs of the members, and allow individuals to join through . 
intragroup agreement. Ad hoc or experimental groups are usually 
formed by persons in or out of the group with some power over the 
members for a specific purpose, serve primarily to perform a task 
related to the purpose, and accept individuals into the group more 
readily. Cooley (1909) considered primary group members to have close 
personal ties with one another, emphasizing face-to-face interaction 
and spontaneous interpersonal behavior. Cooley defined secondary 
groups as more impersonal, characterized by contractual relations, 
and identification with the group as not an end in itself, but a 
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means to an end. The experimenter assumes natural groups to be closely 
related to primary groups and experimental or ad hoc groups to be 
closely related to secondary groups. The present research utilized 
both natural and experimental groups, the natural groups represented 
high and low groupness groups and the experimental groups represented 
nongroup aggregates. 
Conformity and Deviation 
To draw exact definitions for either conformity or deviation 
is difficult, and even more difficult to define these terms in 
reference to their being polar opposites. For example, Marlowe (1971) 
states that the opposite of conformity is taken by some individuals 
to be independence, by others to be rebellion, or counter-conformity, 
anti-conformity, non-conformity, or deviance. Kohn (1969) defines 
conformity as following the dictates of authority, focusing on 
external consequences to the exclusion of internal processes, being 
intolerant of non-conformity and dissent, being distrustful of other 
individuals, and having moral standards that stress obedience to 
the letter of the law. Marlowe (1971) interprets this as resulting 
in a condition of life that allows little freedom of behavior or 
little reason to feel in control of fate. Rollo May (1963) stated 
that the individual who displays conformist thinking does so as a 
result of conflict between the inner and outer forces. This indicates 
that the person has yielded in his judgments under group pressure. 
May felt that these individuals were incapable of coping effectively 
under stress, had feelings of personal inferiority and inadequacy, 
lacked openness and freedom in emotional processes and possessed 
deficiencies in cognitive processes. 
Festinger's (1954) Group Locomotion Hypothesis states that 
groups are always moving toward some goal, thereby establishing 
certain conformity pressures to achieve this means. Social Comparison 
Theory, another of Festinger's (1954) contributions, states that 
group members exert pressures on individuals to conform in order 
to maintain social reality, but deviants tend to destroy the social 
reality, making it impossible to maintain a positive self-evaluation. 
Balance Theory (Heider, 1958) refers to a continued balancing or 
directing of negative and positive sentiment toward either the 
deviant or the conformist. 
These discussions of conformity or deviation in the literature 
have reflected stress on different aspects of the concept for the 
purposes of illustrating a point of view or for advancing a unique 
methodology. The present research focuses on the Sherifian 
definition of conformity for the same reasons. 
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Sherif and Sherif give a useful definition for these terms: 
••.• conforming behavior or deviating behavior means that 
the behavior in question falls within the latitude of 
acceptance or within the latitude of rejection defined 
by a norm ( or set of norms) prevailing in a social 
unit of which the individual is defined as a member 
with some role and status in the organizational scheme. 
(p. 181),. 
Roles and Expected Behaviors 
A discussion of roles is important in the present research 
because of the concept's influence on judgmental behavior, the 
dependent variable. The concept is examined by looking primarily at 
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exchange theory which comprehensively examines the concept. Supporters 
of Exchange Theory feel that role differentiation is determined to 
maximize the rewards and minimize the costs experienced by interacting 
individuals. According to exchange theory, the role an individual 
assumes is contingent upon the reward-cost outcome he perceives. 
Secord and Backman define role behaviors as 
; ••• the behaviors of an actor that are relevant to 
the role he is performing. These behaviors may or 
may not conform to expectations (1964, p. 457). 
Therefore conformity would be determined by the degree to which 
a role description conforms with role behavior. 
Krech defines a role associated with a position as what a 
typical occupant of a given position is expected to do (1962, p. 310), 
position being defined as a category or persons occupying a place in 
a social relation. Taking a similar position, Ullman and Krasner 
define a role as a series of interrelated behaviors appropriate to 
a given situation and learned through past experience (1969, p. 70). 
According to Secord and Backman, role expectations are the 
attitudes and behaviors that a person associates with a role position. 
Secord and Backman (1964) define two aspects of expectation: the 
anticipatory nature of expectations and the normative quality of 
expectations. To provide smooth functioning in social interaction, 
each individual anticipates the behavior of the other person. This 
anticipation helps shape and guide his behavior. When two individuals 
have certain shared expectations in common, shared expectations about 
the other's behavior arises, thus taking on an obligatory quality. 
A role according to Sherif is tantamount to the expected 
behavior of an individual in the scheme of established reciprocities 
of the group (1956). 
This comprehensive coverage of roles adequately encompasses 
its utilization in the present research. In a high groupness group, 
exchange theorists feel that individuals are under obligation to 
cooperate with others to satisfy other group members' needs. Which 
role an individual assumes is presumed to be a result of the reward-
cost outcome he perceives. Exchange theory relates to the present 
study in various aspects. Role expectation~ should be more clearly 
defined and conformity to role expectations should be higher in 
higher solidarity groups than in lower solidarity groups due to the 
anticipatory and obligatory qualities of role expectation (Secord & 
Backman, 1964). 
Status within Groups 
Status structure is frequently used to determine an aspect of 
group structure. Zalenski and Moment (1964) state that status is 
9 
based on a group member's ability to influence other members, and. can 
be measured by observing the attempts at influence over a series of 
interactions. The position of members in the status structure can be 
determined by taking the successful influence acts and dividing them 
by the number of influence acts attempted. The outcome is used to 
determine each individual's position in the status hierarchy. The 
highest position in the hierarchy would be the leader, with other 
members being positioned below him. The individual emerging to the 
leadership role.·is the one who is capable of increasing the rewards 
members experience (Hollander & Julian, 1969J. 
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Status is defined by exchange theorists as the worth of a person 
as estimated by the group members. High status members reward other 
group members through their uncommon rewarding attributes. The more 
an individual is perceived to possess rare rewarding attributes, the 
higher his status will be (Secord & Backman, 1964, p. 297). Also, 
status is likely to be perceived in a global fashion: individuals 
high on one dimension may also be seen as high on others (Secord & 
Backman, 1964,.p. 302). High and low status individuals support the 
same values so as to provide internal resistance to change. Therefore, 
individuals are allowed and encouraged to perform in a manner appro-
priate to their status position (Secord & Backman, 1964, p. 305), 
Exchange theorists also hold that status is accorded to individuals on 
the basis of values and needs held concurrently by group members, 
whereas liking is based more on unique values and needs (Secord & 
Backman, 1964, p. 307). 
The discussion of status in the literature has reflected stress 
on different aspects of the concept for the purposes ·of illustrating a 
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point of view or for advancing a unique methodology. The present. 
research focuses on the Sherifian definition of status for the same 
reasons. The Sherifian definition of status provides a useful 
definition for status in the present research. 
Status refers to a member's position (rank) in a hierarchy of 
power relations in a social unit (group or system) as measured by the 
relative effectiveness of initiative (a) to control interaction, 
decision-making, and activities,and (b) to apply sanctions in cases 
of non-participation and non-compliance (Sherif, 1969, p. 140). Status 
in the present research focused primarily on·the relative effectiveness 
of initiative to control interaction, decision-making, and activities. 
Groupness 
A discussion of groupness and its related concepts, solidarity, 
cohesiveness, and integration is important in the present research 
because of the concepts which influence on the dependent variable, 
judgmental behavior. The concept is examined first by looking at what 
each related c~ncept entials and then how these are related to the 
research. 
Solidarity. Solidarity has been defined in many ways, but is 
primarily noted as the functional effectiveness in attaining group 
goals and is one aspect of a more inclusive term 11groupness," which 
is discussed in a following section. 
MacNeil (1967), on solidarity says: 
Solidarity, then, is an objectively determinable attribute 
of groups. It reflects, and is reflected in, the indi-
vidual attitudes of each group member toward other 
members and himself, in regard to contributional 
dependability in goal attainment (1967, p. 29). 
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Once group structure has begun to stabilize, group members 
evaluate the importance of the group to them as a means of achieving 
satisfaction. The importance a group has for its members, and the 
group's perceived necessity as a means of satisfying the members' 
needs, will determine to a large extent the degree of solidarity a 
group achieves (Cartwright & Lippitt, 1964; Zalenski & Moment, 1964; 
Sherif & Sherif, 1968). In fact, factors that have been found 
conducive to solidarity are a sharing of feelings and experiences by 
members, a willingness by members to participate in the group (Zalenski 
& Moment, 1964), the perception of an external threat (Reeves, 19.70), 
internalization of norms by members, agreement on the goals and methods 
of obtaining the goals (Tiffin & McCormick, 1965), and subordination 
of personal goals (Prentice, 1961). 
Solidarity then deals primarily with the functional effectiveness 
of the relationships within a group in attaining group goals and is 
one aspect of a more global term "groupness." 
Cohesiveness. Cohesiveness has been defined in many ways, but 
is probably most noted for its correlation with interpersonal attrac-
tion or the affective structure within a group. Definitions of group 
cohesiveness make operationalizations very difficult, if not virtually 
impossible. For example, Cartwright and Zander (1960) defined cohe-
siveness as a "resultant of all the forces acting on all members to 
remain in the group." With definitions such as this, operationalizations 
using interpersonal attraction or mutual liking among the group members 
as factors reveals that measures have focused on very limited aspects 
of the total phenomena. Others, such as Festinger, Schacter, and Back 
(1950), defined group cohesiveness as a ratio of the proportion of 
one's friends in the group (or building) to one's total number of. 
friends. 
Exchange theorists (e.g., Homans, 1961; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) 
define attraction in terms of the degree to which persons achieve 
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in their interaction with others a reward-cost outcome in excess of 
some comparison level. Contributing to the need gratification of 
others is considered a reward. Incurred punishments, deterrents in 
interacting with another person, and rewards missed because of the 
interaction consistitute costs. One's comparison level is influenced 
by past experiences in the relation and comparable relations, percep-
tions of what others similar to oneself are receiving, and perceptions 
of rewards and costs in alternative relations. Those members who 
provide maximum rewards and minimum costs to group members receive 
more choices in an affect measuring device (Secord & Backman, 1964). 
Clearly, the concepts have applications in group settings. 
However, a major criticism of exchange theories is that no sufficient 
criteria have been defined which would determine what is rewarding 
or nonrewarding for any given individual. Another criticism of 
exchange theories is that the theories have not improved predictability 
in the area of interpersonal attraction. Perspectives viewing cohe-
siveness primarily by group members' friendship choices neglect 
implicating factors such as the functional interdependencies among 
group members, normative coercion, or outside-the-group factors. 
Feldman (1968) suggests that substantive changes in one or more of 
the various bases of interpersonal attraction do not necessarily 
alter the groups overall cohesiveness. Viewing group cohesiveness 
as composed of many more factors than just interpersonal attraction 
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implies that no correlation necessarily has to exist among the composing 
factors. In fact, it just may be that certain factors may operate 
independently of one another. 
Integration. Thus, consideration of the separate constituents 
of solidarity and cohesiveness, such as the functional effectiveness 
of attaining group goals and interpersonal attraction can be 
unproductive when the goal of research is to investigate the processes 
of varying levels of a larger term which includes more than these 
constituents. In that case, a concept can be employed which admits 
that the problem of identifying "groupness" components and their 
interrelationships has not been solved. Feldman makes such an attempt 
using the term integration. 
Integration has been defined as the amalgamation "of separate 
entities into a cohesive whole which is something different from.its 
parts" (Fairchild, 1944). Feldman feels that to adequately define 
and conceptualize the terms, one must look at the functional bases 
or components of each and uses the term integration to refer to the 
consistency and channeling of behavior among members in the group. 
Feldman (1968) breaks group integration down into normative inte-
gration, functional integration, and interpersonal integration. 
Normative integration as described by Feldman (1968) refers to the 
degree of consensus among group members concerning a number of group 
relevant behaviors. Feldman suggests that normative integration 
does not necessarily presuppose the existence of strong affective 
ties (i;e., cohesiveness) among the members of the group. He notes, 
in fact, that Hiller (1947) has suggested that the genesis of norms 
represents an effort to evade affectional relations. 
Functional integration according to Feldman (1968) refers to 
the degree of complementary specialization among group members and 
to their effectiveness in performing goal attainment, pattern 
maintenance and tension management and external relations. The goal 
attainment function is the accomplishment of whatever goal or goals 
the members of the group decide upon, either specifically stated or 
implied and relates closely with the aforementioned concept of 
solidarity. The pattern maintenance function refers to the mainten-
ance of smooth and consistent relations among members of the group. 
External relations refer to the ability of the group to establish 
and maintain harmonious relations with outside groups. 
Interpersonal integration refers to the reciprocal liking of 
group members for one another according to Feldman and relates 
closely with the concept of cohesiveness. Interpersonal integration 
is accepted as only one facet of group integration, and a person's 
inter-personal integration is said to be determined to a large extent 
by how one likes others in the group and how others in the group 
like him. Feldman has found that mutual liking among group members 
and the effective dispersion of functional responsibilities among 
group members appear to be integral concomitants of each other. It 
15 
was also noted that functional integration and interpersonal integration 
were correlated. These results indicate that the level of symbiotic 
specialization among members of the group and the effectiveness with 
which the different members perform the functions of goal attainment, 
pattern maintenance, and external relations appears to be a crucial 
factor in determining the extent of reciprocal liking within the 
group. Reciprocal liking is also determined by the number of group-
relevant norms; the more there are, the more the reciprocal liking 
among members of the group. Another very interesting finding of 
Feldman is that how much consensus there is regarding norms does not 
necessarily determine the group effectiveness in accomplishing those 
norms. 
There also appears to be sex differences in the extent of group 
integration. In the girls' groups studied by Feldman (1968) there 
tended to be a higher level of integration than among the boy's 
groups studied (groups in summer camps). Functional integration 
may also be partially governed by the size or the group and the 
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degree of integration within a group differs according to the 
environmental settings. One can also see from the statistics obtained 
in Feldman's study of groups in summer camps that the three 
reflectors of integration each evaluate differing aspects of group 
relationships. However, certain methodological problems in Feldman's 
work such as the use of the same response for determining two 
different criteria, could have possibly produced higher correlations 
in his data and therefore contaminated the results. 
Groupness. The term groupness used by Sherif is another global 
term referring to group properties such as cohesiveness, solidarity, 
and more. In fact, the term groupness may be more than the sum of 
these parts. 
Groupness, according to Sherif, is a matter of degree. 
Initially, there is interaction among a number of individuals. 
The degree of groupness here is minimal. After stabilization of 
role-status relationships and norms there isahigher degree of 
groupness than before the stabilization. Sherif refers to a 
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collection of individuals as forming a group to the extent that its 
role and status relationships are stabilized and that its norms and 
values for behavior are shared by the group members and binding on them. 
With this in mind Sherif characterizes the effect that the group 
has in molding the individual members' attitudes and behaviors. This 
is determined by how firmly established the member's role and status 
expectations are and how stringent the members accept the norms. 
The consistency, stability, and strength of the relative stability 
of the role structure and of the group members' reciprocal expec-
tancies affects whether or not one member caa influence the other 
group members' actions. The degree of groupness within a given 
group is related to how important its activities are in the lives 
of the members, to the tenure of association of the group, and to 
how well the group handles problems together or works to achieve 
mutual goals. This type of examination of groupness led Sherif to 
believe that groupness could be studied effectively if the group was 
stabilized over time, and that correct analysis of the groupness of 
the group woul~ have to include the structure and normative properties 
of the group and would also need to measure how important and how 
broad the activities of the group are to the members. 
Thus, groupness is certainly not unidimensional; it is very 
complex. To adequately assess the groupness of a group one must have 
multiple indicators. 
Eisman (1959) found no significant correlation between inter-
personal attractiveness and mean group attractiveness. This finding 
supports the view that friendships within the group and similar 
values between members are not the crucial variables in determining 
groupness. 
Future findings will probably find that the groupness of a group 
may only be measured by multiple indices and then fall short opera-
tionally. The present research utilized the length of time the group 
had been together. the affective relationships within the group, and 
the value of the group in the individual's frame of references as 
indices of groupness. 
Theoretical Basis for the Study 
Introduction 
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The present research is not a crucial test of theoretical 
differences but is a demonstration of group judgmental phenomena 
operating in an uns·tructured stimulus situation. Therefore, the 
present research does not rule out any particular theory. Person 
perceptions theorists, impression formation theorists, implicit 
personality theorists, attribution theorists, and cognitive consistency 
theorists appear to be more concerned with the development and use 
of attributions by individuals in situations where group structure 
cannot be inferred, whereas the present research primarily interested 
in making a statement about an individual's behaviors under conditions 
of varying groupness. Tilis reflects the possibility that hypotheses 
appropriate to individual judgments in groupness situations have not 
been deduced by the theorists mentioned above, therefore making it 
awkward to make deductions in the present research. Elaborations_of 
this point take place within each theory's discussion. It is for these 
reasons that the author prefers the Sherifian viewpoints. The following 
discus~ion examines person perception theories, attribution theories, 
impression formation and the implicit personality theories, cognitive 
consistency theories, and the Sherifian viewpoint respectively. 
Person Perception 
Person perception refers to the individual's processes involved 
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in estimating the external and internal states of other individuals. 
Tagiuri (1968) states that person perception not only involves the 
judgments about people, but objects as well, and is primarily concerned 
with the impressions we form of people as people. 
Person perception focuses specifically on a perceiver's selection, 
in which one attends only to the set of relevant stimuli impressing 
on him and disregards a large amount of extraneous stimuli. The 
perceiver structures his experience to insure that only certain stimuli 
are perceived in order to categorize and to recognize. Subsequently, 
this largely influences one's behavior toward others, which, in turn, 
influences how others behave toward the perceiver. Integration within 
a group provides the perceiver with experience which influences his 
categorization process and produces structure in his perception of 
others. The everchanging behavior of other group members is perceived 
and categorized as if the members possessed certain invariable physical 
and personality characteristics. 
Interaction within a group providing cooperative relationships 
enhances the like reaction toward stimulus individuals and consequently 
influences a perception of that individual. Although person perception 
theorists have not deduced hypotheses appropriate to individual 
judgments in groupness situations it might be assumed that role and 
status relationships gradually become established to enhance cooperative 
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relationships within the group. As the leader assumes decision making 
responsibilities and sanction-imposition responsibilities, he becomes 
gradually perceived as one having a personality congruent with performing 
leader-like tasks and is classified as such by the perceivers (group 
members). Group members assume different positions within the group, 
thereby becoming classified by other group members as having certain 
personalities which correspond to particular responsibilities and roles. 
These cooperative relationships increase expectancies. The existence 
of these expectancies suggests that each individual attempts organi-. 
zation of his experience. 
In terms of the present research the abilities of each individual 
must be considered. There would perhaps be different outcomes between 
a high status individual with poor athletic and judgmental ability 
and a high status individual with excellent athletic and athletic 
judgmental ability, the latter case being the more likely to be over-
estimated. In addition, how important athletics are to the group 
(expressed in values and norms) might in some cases limit attainment 
of high status positions to only those individuals with athletic prowess. 
Due to the fact that the leader assumes a personality congruent 
with leader-like tasks such as decision-making there would be higher 
agreement among group members as to his performance than others. If 
other group members actually accept his decisions because he is leader, 
then it is quite reasonable to expect a higher degree of agreement on 
his performance than on others. Whether or not the performance of 
high status members would be overestimated or underestimated would 
not be of primary concern. 
The author also contends that person perception theorists would 
not predict high groupness groups to be any more judgmentally accurate 
than lower groupness groups, but would predict greater agreement in a 
high groupness group than in a lower groupness group. This also would 
depend upon the group members' acceptance of their roles and statuses. 
Attribution Theory 
Reider's (1958) theory of attribution states that individuals 
predict and control their environment through th~ir perceptions of it. 
Heider assumes that there are commonalities between the processes of 
object perception and person perception. People may be seen as 
attempting to anticipate the effects which their behaviors have on 
the environment and themselves. 
Heider assumes that man perceives his own behavior as caused, 
and that the causal locus can be in either the perceiver or in the 
environment. People therefore may be perceived as loci of causality. 
Most individuals control and determine part of our actions, and we 
perceive others as having similar powers (Hastorf, 1970). Reider's 
position is incapable of making concrete, unequivocal predictions 
for actual situations. However, Jones and Davis assume, as does 
Heider, that behavior has effects, and ·that the perceiver attempts 
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to account for the causes of behavior in terms of its effects. The 
perceiver attempts to infer what effects the actor has created, and 
thus infers dispositional properties to the person. They also state 
that the actor is cognizant of his behavioral effects, and his ability 
to create those effects. 
Kelley's (1967) attribution analysis stresses that self-attribu-
tion does not necessarily have to differ from attribution of others. 
The implication of self-attribution theory is that if an individual 
cannot explain his behavior by referring to external force, then he 
looks inward. When the individual does so, then situational forces 
are most likely to be weak and vague. 
In terms of the present research, people observe an individual's 
actions, and then attempt to explain why he did what he did. Heider 
(1958) states that this is the same as making causal inferences about 
why the behavior occurred. While Jones and Davis (1965) refer to 
this process as organizing the behaviors of others into intent-act-
effect units, self-attribution theorists state that when external 
forces are weak, we infer internal causality as present. 
Harold Kelley (1967) states that attribution theory deals with 
how people answer the "why" question. In order to answer causal 
questions individuals utilize information and arrive at causal 
inferences such as "Property X characterizes Entity Y." How the 
individual util~zes past and present information to arrive at causal 
inferences is of central import to Kelley and the present research. 
Kelley states that the attributor observes and responds to the 
covariation between the observed effect and its possible causes. In 
a group with highly stabilized roles and statuses, the attributor 
has information from multiple observations, whereas, in a non-group 
aggregate the attributor only has information from a single 
observation and responds only to a set of conditions at a given time. 
Kelley states that although the attributor responds to the afore-
mentioned covariation, the true pattern of covariance for possible 
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causes and effects may be concealed or distorted due to the outcome 
of inter-personal behaviors, regardless of accuracy. 
In terms of the present research, high status individuals may 
be assumed to have had much past success due to their abilities and 
effort. Others, therefore, attribute internal causality to the 
individual's behavior (throwing a ball). Concomitant with past 
success might also be others' judgments of the validity of that 
individual's judgments. In the present research an individual throws 
a ball at a target, makes a judgment of his performance and is 
consequently judged by others. If an individual's response is 
associated distinctively with the stimulus, if there is consensus 
among all individuals present, and if the individual's responses have 
been consistent over time, then his judgment may be considered a 
valid response, a successful judgment, and therefore agreed with by 
others. In terms of more specific predictions, there would be more 
judgmental agreement on the high status individuals than on others. 
If it is the case that individuals who make valid judgments 
can be assumed ~o be high status members, that their responses are 
associated distinctly with the stimulus, that there is consensus 
among others as to this, that the individual's responses are 
consistent over time, and that others are influenced by individuals 
who make valid judgments, then it is the author's contention that 
attribution theorists would predict that high groupness groups will 
make judgmental errors less in magnitude than lower groupness groups. 
Due to the fact that judgmental validity is partially determined 
by the accuracy of the individual and that this individual influences 
other group members, this group's total judgmental product should 
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be more accurate than a group whose members rely more on their own 
judgments than on valid judger's judgments. There should also be 
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more agreement in high groupness groups than in lower groupness groups. 
Impression Formation~ Implicit Personality 
Theories 
Concomitant with the perception of attributes in others is 
how accurate one is in assigning attributes to others. Most of the 
recent research in person perception has focused on this aspect of 
information processing. On the basis of a few traits of an individual, 
one classifies and infers other traits. Perceptual information 
processing is impression formation and encompasses the assumptions 
of similarity, implicit personality theory, and stereotyping. 
Solomon Asch proposed two general theories of impression formation. 
The first theory was a variant of an additive model and suggested 
that the quality of the final impression effected the quality of 
each trait. For example, if the final impression is favorable, then 
each trait will be perceived as favorable. The second theory, the 
one Asch most preferred, stated that traits are immediately organized 
to form a whole, or Gestalt, the final impression being more than the 
sum of the parts. To test his theories, Asch (1946) performed a 
series of experiments in which subjects were presented with a list 
of traits characterizing a particular person. They were to write 
a paragraph summarizing their impressions of the individual. Asch 
then told the subjects to select from opposing traits, the one they 
thought consistent and appropriate. The results supported the Gestalt 
position. Asch confirmed many times over his view that there are 
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central traits or pieces of information about the stimulus person which 
dominate the impression, around which other traits were organized 
for their meaning. 
Bruner and Tagiuri (1954) asserted that impressions of others 
are the result of inferences generated by a naive, implicit theory 
of personality. People appear to have an intuitive sense of which 
traits are associated with which other traits. The traits attributed 
to other persons in forming impressions of them are those which appear 
to be compatible with what is actually known about them. These 
complement the implicit perception of the person's personality. In 
accuracy studies this was viewed as an artifact. Hastorf and Bender 
(1952) provide evidence that the projection of similarity occurs when 
subjects merely take part in studies. Perceivers attempted to project 
their own characteristics onto others and implicitly assume that 
others were similar to themselves. 
Bruner, Shapiro and Tagiuri (1958) gave subjects conflicting 
traits and observed the resulting inferences. They demonstrated that 
from knowledge of each of the individual traits the final impression 
could be predicted. Wishner (1960) then reinterpreted the original 
Asch experiments and clearly showed that from knowledge of the 
relationships among traits we can predict response traits from 
stimulus traits. He also defined a central trait as a trait that 
is central to the extent that it correlates highly with the response 
trait. Thus, it appears that the implicit personality theory is 
simply a correlation matrix among traits. 
When we have perceived a person's behavior similarly many times 
and have inferred similarly the causes of the behavior, then the 
feeling of understanding may result. This occurs primarily when we 
perceive that certain traits are correlated. A behavior appears to 
be familiar because we have seen it before and because it implies 
other behaviors. Implicit personality theories and the assumed 
correlations between traits which individuals utilize are general-
izations from our own and others' behavior (Hastorf, Schneider, & 
Polefka, 1970). When applied to others these generalizations are 
tantamount to stereotypes. 
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When placed in an unstructured stimulus situation such as the 
present research and required to judge other group members' performances, 
an individual, according to impression formation, would perceive the 
individual's performance as fitting into a category. Due to the lack 
of external anchors, the judgment would largely be a product of the 
stereotype in which the individual was categorized. The author 
speculates that the judgment, according to impression formation 
would include such traits as athletic ability as perceived in the 
past, or other traits correlated with such. Impression formation 
appears to place stress in making judgments about an individual as 
a result of a matrix of influences. Properties of perceived groupness 
should play a major role in the impression matrix. This study was 
based on the expectation that individual judgments would reflect 
identifiable perceptions of group structure. Thus, impression 
formation would predict overestimation of high status group members, 
underestimation of low status members, the magnitude •of such rela-
tionships varying systematically with groupness. In addition, they 
would also predict a negative correlation between the judgmental 
accuracy of the group or nongroup aggregate and the groupness of that 
group or nongroup aggregate, both predictions which result from the 
presumed influence of groupness on the impression matrix. 
Cognitive Consistency 
Cognitive consistency theories also consider perception and 
incorporation. Cognitive consistency operates primarily on the 
hedonistic assumptions that man strives to maintain or maximize his 
relative position.in the environment. Man attempts to maintain 
stability, balance and consistency among his existing beliefs, percep-
tions, attitudes, etc. When instability exists, each individual 
utilizes certain techniques to resolve this inconsistency. 
Dissonance is defined as an aversive drive state which occurs 
whenever an individual simultaneously holds two psychologically 
inconsistent cognitions such as two ideas, beliefs, or opinions. 
Festinger (1957) states that: "Two elements are in a dissonant 
relation, if considering these two alone, the observe of one element 
would follow from the other." Assuming the occurence of dissonance 
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to be unpleasant, individuals attempt to reduce it either by adding 
consonant cognitions or by changing making cognitions more consonant 
with each other. Dissonance theory does not assume that man is a 
rational animal. Dissonance theory suggests that man rationalizes 
inconsistencies to appear rational to himself and to others. Dissonance 
theory is notorious for its lack of formal terms, specific predictions 
and operational definitions. 
Festinger (1957) feels that dissonance is, in part, influenced 
by past experience. The magnitude of dissonance which arises from 
a particular situation is proportional to the number of relevant 
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elements that are dissonant to each other and the relative importance 
to the individual of those elements. As the magnitude of dissonance 
increases, there is a greater tendency to reduce the dissonance. 
Festinger suggests that to reduce dissonance one may change a behavioral 
cognitive element, or change an environmental cognitive element, or 
add new cognitive elements. 
The basic term, cognition, is defined as that which is understood 
by belief, opinion, attitude, etc. The identification and measurement 
of cognitions are not specified. The experimenter's assumptions 
determine the existence of a given cognition and what its basis may be. 
Cognitions interact only if relevant to one another. Cognitions 
may support one another, act together, produce tangents, form aggregates, 
contradict one another, modify one another, or conflict with one 
another (Festinger, 1957). Thus, relevant cognitions may be consonant 
or dissonant with one another. Consonance implies mutual consistency, 
and dissonance, inconsistency. 
In terms of the present research, dissonance theory would 
assume that the individual would avoid dissonant-producing information, 
thereby following closely the normative expectations within the group. 
Factors derived from group properties, initially external to an 
individual group member, reside in the individual as "internal 
attitudes" or expectancies which "form social references scales 
for the individual" (MacNeil, 1967, p. 4). 
By conforming to the established norms governing the group 
members' roles and statuses, dissonance would not be increased. 
Deviating from these norms would mandate sanctions in the form of 
punishment by the group leader, thereby increasing dissonance. It 
is presumed that a group member will selectively expose himself to 
information which would not increase dissonance. If the external 
physical stimulus situation has little structure, then the individual 
would abide by his existing stabilized cognitions and conform to the 
group norms. 
Sherif and Sherif (1969) postulated concepts such as an 
individual's psychological structuring and "immediate frame of 
reference," and perceptions of stimulus situations. The immediate 
frame of reference denotes the totality of interrelated external 
factors in the situation and internal factors arising from the indi-
vidual that are operating at a given ~ime (p. 33). For example, 
structured stimulus situations set limits to alternatives in psycho-
logical patterning and vice versa. This could easily lead to the 
individual's overestimation of high status members' performances in 
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the sociogame, and underestimation of lower status members' performances. 
Dissonance theorists would perhaps predict that there would be 
a high degree of agreement among members of high groupness groups 
than among low groupness groups. Deviation from norms in high groupness 
groups would mandate sanctions in the form of punishment by the leader, 
therefore, members would conform or agree to avoid the sanctions. 
Whether or not high groupness groups would be more or less accurate 
than lower groupness groups would not be of primary significance. 
The Sherifian Viewpoint 
The present study focused interest specifically on "norms" and 
"status." According to Sherif a norm is an evaluative scale designating 
an acceptable latitude and an objectionable latitude for behavior, 
activity, events, beliefs, or any other object of concern to members 
of a social unit (1969, p. 141). Chang (1973) discussed norms in 
the following way: 
Social norms, prescribed or proscribed, informal 
or formal, possess the following properties: 1) 
They do not necessarily refer to the average 
behavior of members. 2) They are evaluative and 
arbitrary. 3) Social norms are standardized 
generalizations which apply to classes of objects. 
4) Social norms designate a latitude of behavior 
acceptable or not acceptable. 5) Social norms 
have a tendency to be persistent and stable. 
6) Social norms can be changed. 7) Social norms 
vary in size of latitude, and intensity of 
sanction when violated. 8) Social norms exist 
in every society and any enduring human group. 
"The existence of social norms can be inferred 
from 1) Observed regularities in attitudes and 
behavior of members, 2) Increasing convergence 
toward a range of behavior, 3) and Sanctions in 
cases of deviation. 
"The general psychological tendency is toward 
structuring of experience and establishing a 
frame of reference. The frame of reference is 
involved in many or all of the major fields of 
psychology: in sensory phenomena, in perception, 
in affectivity, in memory, etc. Thus, people in 
a state·being torn by conflicting norms or values 
(a state of normlessness), are conducive to 
heightened suggestibility. 
"Social interaction over a time span is a necessary 
condition for the emergence of social norms. 
Norms are typically formed in conditions lacking 
objective structure in some or many aspects 
(existence of alternatives). Social norms are 
inevitable because social regulations of behavior 
and attitude become necessary vehicles for solvi.ng 
problems and needs satisfaction. 
Sherif (1936) performed a series of laboratory experiments on 
norm formation in an unstructured situation (the autokinetic) which 
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utilized the apparent movement (omnidirectionally) of a single point of 
stationary light in a completely dark room. The stimulus used was 
a tiny, stationary point of light seen through a small hole in a 
metal box located in a dark lab room. Results revealed that an 
individual alone in the AK established a norm (range and point) 
subjectively, and that this norm persisted over time. When indi-
viduals with previously established individual norms were placed 
together in the AK, their norm medians tended to converge. The 
resulting norm was a joint product of all the participants. 
When a collection of individuals interacted initially with 
no previous experience in the AK, a social norm peculiar to the 
laboratory group was established. The consequent convergence was 
greater than when a lone individual established a norm. When an 
individuals with a previously established social norm was studied 
alone in the AK the social norm established with the group tended 
to persist. 
Thus, the formation of common reference points or anchorages 
exemplifies the psychological tepdency in norm formation. An 
objective anchorage exposed to the individual appears to determine 
his structural relationships of the experience. When such an 
anchorage does not exist, the individual will perceive the unstruc-
tured situation from his own internally evolved anchorages. The 
aforementioned research supports the argument that internalized 
social norms become primary factors in determining or changing his 
subsequent reactions to the situations. The experiments suggest 
that a norm emerging in social interaction is dependent upon the 
quality of the interaction. 
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Walter (1955) found that reduced variability of individual judg-
ments occurred in the AK from session to session. This confirms earlier 
observations of .a psychological tendency toward stabilization for 
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judgment in an unstructured stimulus situation. Attempts at measuring 
the internal attitudes concerning the group pose problems because of 
frequent reluctance to reveal them to outsiders, and, in fact, by 
the individual's being unaware of their existence. For these reasons, 
indirect methods of investigation have been deemed necessary in order 
to keep subjects relatively unaware that they are participating in 
research concerning group properties. For example, an unstructured 
stimulus situation which lessens the influence of external factors 
in the individual's immediate frame of reference may be utilized 
to enhance the contribution of internal factors, thereby focusing 
the measurement problem. 
The ppysical stimulus world presents objective properties 
and relationships that determine the type of psychological patterning 
which results when the individual attends to them. When the 
propertiss and relationships are specific, intense, or compelling, 
the alternatives for psychological patterning are limited. There 
is little variability among individuals in the method by which such 
structured stimulus situations are experienced and responded to 
(Sherif & Sherif, 1969, p. 30). 
In unstructured stimulus situations, alternatives in psychological 
patterning are increased {Sherif & Sherif, 1969, p. 30), Many 
objects and events in the stimulus realm appear to be ambiguous, 
complex, and rapidly changing. Differences in what is attended to 
and differences among individuals in their experiences, motives, and 
attitudes can produce great distinctions in the way people perceive 
and size up the situation. The individual's part in the patterning 
of experiences is larger. Therefore, individual differences in 
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experience and behavior are increased (p. 30). Consequently, the 
more unstructured the external situation, the greater the contribution 
of internal factors (including internalized social values and 
standards) (p. 31). Also, the more unstructured the stimulus 
situation, the greater the effectiveness of (external) social 
influences (solutions, communications, suggestions) that offer an 
alternative for psychological patterning. Internal factors and 
experience are inferred from behavior. 
One cannot directly observe another's desire or experience. 
Operations occurring within the individual must be inferred behaviorally, 
verbally or non-verbally, in relevant stimulus situations. Considering 
the aforementioned statements with regard to internal and external 
factors, behavior will reveal measurable effects of internal 
factors, as well as external stimulus factors. 
Sherifians wouldassume that an individual group member's 
behavior appears to be a product of internal factors, such as 
motives, memory of past experiences, ego-attitudes, desires, 
ambitions, emotions, states of the organism, socially derived 
attitudes, and language concepts. These are affected by psychological 
processing in association with external factors impinging on the 
individual such as the immediate external situation, the social 
setting, objects, persons, groups and cultural products. The present 
investigation focused primarily on the internalized group norms, 
which are reflected to a greater degree in the individual's perception. 
of (physical) unstructured stimulus situations or in social conditions 
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or other settings which offer alternatives easily affected by the 
individual's internal factors,!·~·, expectations in regard to 
probable performance. 
In terms of the present research, factors derived from group 
properties originally external to an individual reside in the 
individual as "internal attitudes" or expectancies which form 
social reference scales for the individual. Utilizing an unstructured 
stimulus situation enhances the experimenter's tapping of the 
individual's internal factors. 
Along these lines, MacNeil feels that: 
Reciprocal expectancies a~e relatively persistent 
internal factors jointly interacting with other 
pertinent internal and external factors to determine 
each individual's psychological structuring,!·~·, 
perception of a social stimulus situation (1967, 
p. 4). 
Expectancies as related to the present investigation refers 
to the individual group member's estimation of his and the other 
group members' contributions toward group goal attainment and the 
concomitant perceiver contribut io.n of each· member. The existence 
of these expectancies suggests that each individual attempts 
organization of his experience. 
Accepting the Sherifian view as the prime theoretical base 
for the present research has several advantages. One advantage is 
that the Sherifian approach adequately encompasses the present 
research theoretically. In contrast to the theories of person 
perception, attribution theories, impression formation theories, etc. 
the Sherifian view places primary emphasis on group properties 
which influence group members' judgments. This is essential in 
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order to comprehensively encompass the author's hypotheses. Using 
the Sherifian view has the additional advantage over others in making 
specific predictions in situations where group parameters are employed. 
Sherifians would predict that high status group members would be 
overrated, low status members underestimated,and the magnitude of 
such would vary systematically with group solidarity. High solidarity 
groups are predicted to make larger magnitudes of error than low 
solidarity groups or nongroup aggregates respectively. 
Results of Empirical Studies 
Whyte's (1943) classic study of street gangs revealed that 
high status group. members usually incited group activities, 
especially those in which they excelled, and that within the group, 
high status members were perceived as being superior in most tasks. 
Whyte found that when the group took interest in bowling, low status 
members who bowled well when apart from the group bowled in an 
inferior manner in relation to other group members, thus their 
performance correlated with group expectations despite their making 
strong effotts to improve their performance with the group and their 
protests that they could do better. 
Asch (1955) demonstrated that when the external physical 
stimulus situation was relatively unstructured, external social factors 
such as a majority were weighted more heavily in the frame of reference. 
Thus, an individual's judgments of relative lengths of lines in 
comparison to a standard line were significantly influenced by social 
pressure when in the presence of a confederate majority. Zajonc 
reviewing Asch's study stated: 
Solomon Asch (1962) fou~d conclusive eyidence 
that adult human subjects imitated a judgment 
that they knew contrary to facts, contrary to 
what they perceived, or both. Asch obtained 
this imitation of false judgments without rein-
forcing the "models" for their responses and 
without reinforcing the subject for his. 
In one of Asch's experiments, subjects-adult 
college students-were required to compare the 
length of a "standard" line with one of three 
"comparison" lines. Both the standard and the 
comparison lines were in plain sight of the 
subjects, and the judgments were relatively 
easy. The length of the standard varied from 
1 to 9 inches. Among the three comparison 
lines, one was always the same length as the 
standard. The other two comparison lines 
differed from the standard by ],,; - 2~ inches. 
The results of Asch's experiments were astounding. 
In the absence of a false majority, subjects were 
able to achieve about 93% accuracy in their 
judgments. However, subjects exposed to the 
false judgments of the experimenter's confederates 
reached only 67% of accuracy-a 26% drop. 
When subjects are allowed to make their judgments 
privately and are not required to announce them 
aloud, the amount of yielding goes down somewhat 
(Deutsch and Gerard, 1955), but it does not 
disappear (p. 37-39). 
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Harvey (1953) studied the relation between status and judgments 
of predicted future performance within a group having high, middle, 
and low status members. Members of ten groups estimated each of 
their group members' probable scores in a dart game before each 
game. Findings revealed that high status members' performances were 
consistently overrated, and low status members were less subject to 
overestimation with a tendency toward underestimation. Harvey (1954) 
also studied the relation between group properties and judgmental 
behavior through having natural groups of college girls judge one 
anothers' performances under conditions of distraction where the 
subjects recorded place names while listening to nonrelated recorded 
37 
texts. Other conditions included having friendly outgroups present 
or hostile outgroups present. Harvey found that in the presence of 
hostile outgroups,the ingroup members' performances were overestimated 
more than when the group performed without any outgroups present, i·~·, 
the effect was intensified. In the presence of friendly outgroups, 
the overestimation was not significant. These findings were reported 
by Harvey as increased group solidarity in the presence of negatively 
rated others. Harvey also found that correlation between status 
within groups and judgmental errors increased positively in the 
presence of hostile outgroups. 
Sherif (1961) found that when two groups competed in a bean 
collection task and judged the number of beans collected by their 
ingroup when viewing a surrogate standard, overestimation of the 
ingroup and underestimation of the outgroup occurred. 
Sherif (1961) studied experimentally formed groups of boys in 
the Robber's Cave experiment. The subjects threw handballs at a 
relatively unstructured, archery-type (bulls eye with rings) target 
and judged their own and others' performances within the group. 
Findings were that the direction and magnitude of judgmental errors 
were directly related to within group status and that correlation 
appeared to increase with higher solidarity groups. Solidarity 
per se was not studied in this experiment. 
MacNeil (1967) studied the relationship between solidarity, 
judgmental behavior, and status. High and low status members were 
observed in high and low solidarity groups utilizing both the 
autokinetic situation and the "shotgun range" situation, the latter 
having subjects judge the number of shot holes in a surrogate target 
38 
(rabbit) resulting from group members' performance with a shotgun. 
In both cases an "experienced" member selected according to his status 
position, and who had been previously indoctrinated with an arbitrary 
norm was present. Indoctrination in the judgment situations occurred 
in training sessions with ad hoc groups, using majority pressure by 
peers who were actually confederates collaborating with the experimenter. 
To determine the relative "power" of the "experienced" member's status 
position, the degree of acceptance of the indoctrinated member's 
judgments by the group was utilized. All indoctrinated members 
exerted some influence on group members due to the fact that they 
were perceived as experienced. Findings demonstrated that in high 
solidarity groups, high status members exerted the greatest influence 
on other group members and that low status members exerted lesser 
influences. In low solidarity groups both high and low status 
individuals exerted approximately the same influence. Interpreting 
these· findings revealed that solidarity as a group factor efffected 
the relative power of individuals in various status positions. 
Davis (1.970) utilized an unstructured target approximating a 
regulation baseball strike zone, and studied the relationship between 
group solidarity and judgmental errors which occur when group members 
judge their own and other group members' performances. Using natural 
groups, Davis examined the relationship between sociogame behavior and 
status position within groups. Davis found systematic relations 
between status position and judgmental errors, between the group's 
judgmental ranking of each individual and his self rank, and in 
total accuracy of judgment. All of the relationships varied systematically 
under differing conditions of group solidarity. 
A compelling question for the social scientist is to define 
the parameters of the relationship between group factors such as 
groupness status, and judgmental bias. In order for the social 
psychologist to effectively investigate the individual's experience 
and behavior in relation to social stimulus situations, he should 
gain knowledge of the interrelations of group properties such as 
groupness, status, and judgmental bias. To accomplish a task such 
as this necessitates the development of new methodologies of non-
reactive measures of group properties. The present investigation 
attempts to develop such a methodology. 
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CHAPTER III 
PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The relationships between group member status, groupness, 
judgmental errors, and nongroup aggregate characteristics have not 
been inspected fully. The present investigation was designed to 
study the relationship of group solidarity to judgmental errors 
which occurred when group members judged their own and other 
group members' performances in a baseball sociogame situation. The 
investigation of the relationship between the status positions of 
individuals within the group, sociogame behavior, and judgments of 
performance was of major priority. The correlation between the 
actual performance of each individual and the subsequent judgments 
by all participating group members provided the basic data of 
analysis. These data were derived and studied under varying conditions 
of groupness. 
In order to present a social stimulus situation which ranked 
high in realism and importance to the subjects, and which gave an 
objective measure of the subject's actual performance, a baseball 
sociogame was constructed. An unstructured stimulus situation for 
subjects and provisions for an objective measure of the subject's 
performance were inherent in the design. 
Judging one's own and others' performance in the baseball 
sociogame provided a situation comparable to functions of pitcher 
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and umpire in baseball. Baseball was selected as the game to be. 
used due to its popularity among American youth. 
The Specific Problems Investigated 
When group members from high groupness groups (H) and low 
groupness groups (L) as well as individuals from nongroup aggregates 
(N) judged their own and other fellow team members' performances 
in a baseball sociogame, errors occurred. The errors were studied 
in relation to the following specific problems: 
1. In high and low groupness groups (H,L), what is the rela-
tionship between the status of an individual and judgmental errors? 
2. What is the relationship between judgmental accuracy and 
groupness? 
It is hypothesized that the behavior of individuals in a 
sociogame is systematically related to certain of their group 
properties, and that groupness is a contributing variable in the 
magnitude of such relationships. 
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses concerning the relationships among 
certain group properties and sociogame behaviors were asserted: 
1. There is a positive correlation between judgmental errors 
and status position, the magnitude of such relationship varying 
systematically with groupness. 
2. There is a negative correlation between the judgmental 
accuracy of the group or nongroup aggregate and the groupness of 
that group or nongroup aggregate. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHOD AND PROCEDURE 
The locale where this research was conducted was a midwest 
land grant university which recruits students primarily from within 
the state. The students number approximately 20,000 including the 
graduate body. The author enjoyed a special relationship with a 
portion of the fraternity system as a housefather to a small 
fraternity. This provided the author with excellent opportunities 
for formal and informal observations. 
Subject Selection and Classification 
A disguised sociogram (Appendix A) was utilized to determine the 
group's membership, status structure, and groupness. Classification 
for the groups consisted of two high groupness groups (A and B), two 
low groupness groups (N and P), and two nongroup aggregates (C and D), 
the classification being determined by the results of the sociogram. 
The high groupness groups selected for participation were members 
and pledges of a small fraternity. The low groupness groups came 
from a college class which was divided into sections at the beginning 
of a semester, and tested approximately three months later. The 
nongroup aggregates members were individually selected from different 
classes, the size determined by the size of the high groupness group. 
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The sex of the participants were primarily determined by availability, 
and was not controlled also. Each group participated on different days. 
During the execution of the sociogame, the subjects were not 
made cognizant that their social relationships w~re under observation. 
The subjects were given a purported rationale for the sociogame. To 
assure privacy, the names of the subjects who participated in the 
research are referred to by an identity number in the thesis and 
are in the confidential care of the experimenter. Two experimenters 
were present during the research at all times. The groups were not 
designated in any way which would enable identification of the 
individuals or the group. 
·High Groupness Groups (A and B) 
The high groupness groups selected for participation were 
male fraternity members and fraternity pledges within a fraternity 
with whom the experimenter had extensive knowledge of. One group 
was composed of fraternity members who had known each other for at 
least year with some relationships exceeding four years. The groups 
contained the fraternity president, the vice-president, two old 
members, and a new member. The five members who completed the 
disguised sociogram gave a total of 50 sociometric choices of which 
7 r2vealed preference for one another in the group and 22 revealed 
preference for other fraternity members or pledges. The members 
revealed spending an average of 62% of their time with fraternity 
members or pledges and 4 out of 5 preferred spending their time with 
group members rather than others. Nicknames, private jokes, and 
other common products of group interaction were present thus indicating 
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groupness. Groupness was also reflected when the members were called 
as a reminder of their appointment. The members coerced those who 
volunteered to show up as a group thus binding the group as a whole 
to specific commitments. However, two members who volunteered did 
not show up or give reasons ahead of time for their absence and were 
not sanctioned later by any of the members. 
The other high groupness group was composed of male fraternity 
pledges who knew each other for at least four months, lived together 
in the same rooms, shared the house chores, and did many activities 
together outside the house. The pledge class had no officers or 
official status categories. Of 74 sociometric choices there were 
8 preferences for the group which threw and 22 for other fraternity 
members and pledges. The pledges indicated spending an average 
of 60% of their time together and 2 of 8 preferred being with group 
members rather than others in their free time. There were no 
nicknames or private jokes revealed but all of the .pledges who 
volunteered showed up. 
Low Groupness Groups (N and P) 
The low groupness groups chosen for participation were male and 
female classmates, who for a semester were broken down into groups 
to work on class projects. From the disguised sociogram responses 
of one group of seven individuals it was learned that 6 of 7 preferred 
to be with individuals outside their group in their free time. Of 
58 sociometric responses 4 revealed preferences for members within 
the group, and 48 to others outside the group. The group spent less 
than 1% of their time together. This group was not identifiable as 
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members of a social unit and used no nicknames. When asked ques.tions 
as a whole, there was little agreement as to who would respond for 
the group as a whole. All who volunteered showed up. 
The low groupness groups were nearly identical. Of 65 sociometric 
response for seven individuals one preference indicate an affective 
choice for a group member. The group indicated spending less than 
1% of their time together and 6 of 7 preferred others outside the 
group to be with in their free time. The group used no nicknames, 
but all volunteers showed up. 
Nongroup Aggregates (C and D) 
· The individuals composing the nongroup aggregates were males 
and females selected from different classes at a university. All 
who participated revealed that they did not know or know of any 
other team members. Of 76 sociometric responses for individuals 
no affective choices for team members were indicated. No nicknames 
were used nor were any other reflections of groupness indicated. 
The other non~roup aggregate was composed of seven individuals who 
were strangers. Of 59 sociometric response no affective choices 
were made for ~ther team members nor was there any indication of 
status or role structure for the team. 
Groupness Determination 
The degree of "groupness" of the group was determined by 
sociogram responses, such as the length of time the group had been 
together, the affective relationships within the group, and the value 
of the group in the individual's frame of reference as measured by 
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the sociogram responses. Groupness was determined by adding the. rank 
orderings of each group to the following questions and then ranking 
the results. The high groupness groups received rankings 1 and 2, 
the low groupness groups received rankings 3 and 4, and the group 
aggregates received rankings 5 and 6. Groupness was determined 
by the responses among within group members to questions regarding time 
spent together, and to the concluding question on the disguised 
sociogram. The responses were then ranked in terms of magnitude. 
Information was provided by the individuals' responses to question 1 
by comparing the persons ranked to the group members and obtaining 
a fraction. Ranking the fractions provided the necessary information. 
Average time together was found by adding each member's estimate of 
group tenure, dividing this sum by the number of members, and then 
ranking. Responses to the concluding question were useful in 
determining groupness py adding the number of members choosing the 
group, dividing this figure by the number of group members, and then 
ranking. An example of the disguised sociogram is provided in 
Appendix A. 
Judgmental accuracy was determined by adding deviations from 
the actual score together disregarding sign, then dividing this .sum 
by the number of judgments per cell times the number of cells. These 
numbers were then rank ordered. 
Status Determination 
Status determination within the group was made according to the 
sociogram responses. A first choice to question 2 was given a weighting 
of 4, a second choice a weighting of 3, a third choice, 2, and all 
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others, a weighting of 1. The responses were than ranked ordered and 
status consequently determined. High status members received a ranking 
of 1, next higher status member a ranking of 2, etc. The lowest status 
member receiving a ranking equal to that of the group size .• 
Apparatus 
The baseball sociogame used in the present research, a derivative 
of Saerif's (1961), presented an unstructured stimulus situation, 
as perceived by the subjects. A brown cloth covering insured the 
lack of judgmental anchors or reference points. An objective 
scorer located behind the sociogame could accurately determine 
which scoring area of the target received the impact of the ball 
through reading the "fla~," which was released via a mechanical 
feature. The magnitude of the score correlated with its value 
counterpart in baseball; the highest score (5) corresponded to the 
corner of the strike zone; the next highest (3) corresponded to the 
middle of the strike zone; a lesser value (1) corresponded to pitches 
adjacent to the strike zone; and the least value (0) corresponded 
to all other pitches. A pitch striking between scoring areas could 
also be indicated to the "actual" scorer. A diagram of the 
scoring areas, "edge" strips, and dimensions are indicated in 
Appendix B. Innovative features of the sociogame target included 
its portability, durability, including being rust-proof and shock 
resistant, accuracy, and operability, requiring minimally one 
experimenter to operate the entire sociogame. 
A spatial diagram of the complete sociogame is indicated in 
Appendix C. A classroom was chosen as the site for the research 
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due to its seclusion from distractions, its protection from the weather, 
and its environmental uniformity. Two different sized balls were 
used due to the ball being thrown at different speeds. 
Experimental Procedure 
Each .group participated in isolation from other groups or 
individuals. Conveying the superficial purpose of the sociogame 
as well as the scoring areas and procedure, upon the group's arrival 
was accomplished by the experimenter saying: 
What we are going to do today us to see how 
well each of you can judge the pitches thrown 
just as an umpire does in a game. A pitcher 
is most effective in baseball if he can pitch 
in the corners of the strike zone rather than 
the center. Therefore, (pointing to a diagram 
of the strike zone and adjacent. areas) pitches 
in the corner of the strike zone will be given 
a score of 5. Pitches in the center of the 
strike zone a score of three, and pitches 
outside the strike zone a score of 1. If the 
ball misses the target completely, the throw 
will be repeated and not scored. You will 
each throw two sets of five pitches. After 
each throw, the pitcher will give his judgment 
first, then each of you will individually 
judge his pitch in order, always the same order. 
You will take turns throwing in the same order 
that you call out your judgments. 
Two practice trials were then given with the experimenter throwing. 
The objective (actual) scores were recorded by an experimenter's 
assistant located behind the target. The judgments by the group 
members were recorded by the experimenter. 
Following the completion of the sociogame, the disguised 
sociogram (Appendix A) was administered to that respective group or 
aggregate. Instructions prior to the administration of the sociogram 
were: 
Now, I would like each of you to fill out this 
questionniare. Please sit where the pencils 
and questionnaires are. The information obtained 
from this questionnaire is strictly confidential 
so that no one will ever know how you answer 
except me. If you have any questions, please 
feel free to ask at any time. There is no hurry. 
Please take your time and answer these questions 
as carefully and accurately as you can." 
The sociogram pertained generally to the sociogame activities, 
but included general information as well. The responses to the 
sociogram helped enable the experimenter to determine the group's 




Individuals having varying degrees of established social 
relationships judged other group member's performance in this research. 
The measurement of these judgments satisfied requirements for the 
concept of status. Normatively derived expectancies, which develop 
through goal directed interpersonal interaction, largely affect 
an individual's perception of performance. Judging other's 
performances in relatively unstructured stimulus situations reflects· 
a tendency away from scores objectively determined toward scores 
reflecting status rank. The amount of displacement has, in fact, 
been utilized in determining the relative groupness of groups in 
previous research. 
Testing.these concepts required a quantifiable measure of 
judgmental error and an operational determination of groupness. 
An actual score for each pitch was obtained by recording from the 
target mechanisms which area was hit by th.e ball. Judgments of 
other group member's performances in a baseball sociogame and 
objective recordings of each thrown were the raw data of this 
research. 
The subjects were 42 members of six treatment groups, with 
each group qualifying for one of three solidarity categories. The 
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direction and magnitude of judgmental errors and the respective. 
relationships to status and groupness of the groups were of primary 
interest in the research. The complete matrix of objective and 
judgmental scores for every subject is presented in Appendix D. 
All judgments were considered valid. 
Judgmental Rank and Status 
Hypothesis 1 states that a positive correlation exists between 
status position within a group and judgmental rank, the strength 
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of which varies directly with groupness. Tiie judgmental rank was 
determined by the rank ordering of members with respect to the magnitude 
and direction of judgmental errors and is presented in Appendix D. 
Total judgmental errors received (and the corresponding) judgmental 
rank are shown by status position, and groupness category presented 
in Appendix D. 
The sociogram results obtained from the question regarding 
effective initiative reflected definite delineations as to who ranked 
in the top st~tus position for both high and low groupness groups. 
There were no ties in the high groupness groups and there were ties 
in the rankings below the top position in the low groupness groups. 
Therefore, definite delineations in terms of effective initiative 
were reflected in the high groupness groups, and to a lesser extent 
in the low groupness groups. By definition, the nongroup aggregates 
had no substantial status positions and left blank the effective 
initiative question by choosing the alternative statement indicating 
not having knowledge of anyone in their "group." 
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The Pearson product moment correlation coefficient for status 
and judgmental rank for the pooled high groupness groups was -.07 
and for the pooled low groupness groups was .23. Using Fisher's 
r to z transformations, and consequently a z test, the correlation 
between status position and judgmental rank (contrary to prediction) 
' 
was found to be not significant (z=.36t x=.05, 1-tailed) (See Appendix 
E). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was not supported. 
Judgmental Accuracy and Groupness 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that judgmental accuracy should increase 
with decreasing groupness. The sociogram results reflecting groupness 
provided an adequate delineation between high and low groupness groups. 
High groupness groups indicated spending 62% (A) and 60% (B) of their 
time per week together. Both low groupness groups (N and P) reflected 
spending less than 1% of their time per week together. When choosing 
between doing an activity with members of their group or with 
a person or people outside the group, 80% of the high groupness group A, 
25% of the high groupness group B, 14% of the low groupness group N, 
and 14% of· .the low groupness group P chose doing an activity with 
group members. Nongroup aggregates did not answer that qu~stion. 
because they did not know anyone in their "group." In response to 
the question regarding what one person the individual would most like 
to be with, on a scale of 10, the high groupness group A reflected. 
a mean of 4.4, high groupness group B, 2.75, low groupness group N, 
.571, low groupness group P, .14, nongroup aggregate Ca mean of 0, 
and nongroup aggregate D a mean of O. These three indices of groupness 
distinctly differentiated between groups of differing groupness and 
substantiated the author.' s observations. 
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The judgmental accuracy was determined by summing the deviations 
from the actual scores regardless of sign for each group or nongroup 
aggregate and is represented in Appendix F. Therefore, high scores 
represented lower accuracy and vice-versa. The pooled high groupness 
group mean was 48.84, the pooled low groupness group mean 85.00, and 
the pooled nongroup aggregate mean was 75.6. A 2 tailed t-test between 
the pooled high groupness group and the pooled low groupness group 
was significant (t=3.03, df=25, x=.05). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 
which predicted that judgmental accuracy should increase with 
decreasing groupness was not supported. In fact, judgmental accuracy 
tended to increase with increasing groupness. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Persons performing together on a common task and judging one 
anothers' performances inevitably leads to (judgmental) errors 
occurring, especially in an unstructured stimulus situation. The 
recreational situation contrived for the present research was derived 
from the game of baseball and intended for the study of social 
relationships among individuals. 
The relationship between groupness and patterns of judgmental 
errors was of interest in the present research. Systematic 
variations in judgment were expected but not found in relation 
to the status position of the performer. The relationship between 
judgmental accuracy and groupness was found to be significant between 
high and low groupness groups in one case, but in the direction 
opposite to that expected. 
As a modification of the Sherifian handball throw, the baseball 
sociogram used in the present research served as an unstructured 
stimulus situation. Members of high groupness groups, low groupness 
groups and nongroup aggregates made judgments of their own and 
others' performances in pitching a ball at the sociogame target. 
Members observed and then judged each throw as: 5 for each hit 
on the corner of the strike zone; 3 for a center hit (in the strike 
zone); 1 for a near miss; and O for a wide miss. Both judged and 
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actual scores were recorded after every throw. Judgmental errors 
including the direction, magnitude, and pattern of such were computed 
and analyzed. 
Subjects were college students in Oklahoma. The high groupness 
groups were composed of fraternity members, one group being members 
and the other group being pledges. The low groupness groups were 
students in the same class who were broken down into groups at the 
beginning of the semester and worked together on class projects and 
subject matter. These groups were run as subjects at the end of 
that semester. The nongroup aggregates were students selected from 
different classes who, when questioned, indicated that they did not 
know or know of anyone else in their respective group. Objective 
determinants of status and groupness were received from disguised 
sociogram responses. 
Discussion of Experimental Results 
Due to the lack of objective structure in the sociogame and to 
the response alternatives, judgmental errors including internal 
attitudinal factors occurred. Throughout the sociogame, enthusiasm 
and enjoyment appeared to predominate. All members of the groups and 
nongroup aggregates cooperated fully and never questioned the 
underlying purpose~ 
The results of this research did not support previous findings 
and as indicated in the following paragraphs, supported only one 
prediction made in the introductory theoretical chapter. It is 
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the author's contention that these findings did not accurately reflect 
theoretical distinctions primarily because of methodological 
weaknesses. Following the theoretical discussion is a methodological 
discussion which the author feels primarily accounts for the obtained 
results. 
Hypothesis 1 
Findings regarding the positive correlation between judgmental 
errors and status position within groups was not supported. Group 
members did not overestimate the performance of high status members 
nor did they underestimate the performance of low status members. 
Instead there was no systematic correlation'between judgmental errors 
and status position. 
Person perception theorists might explain this as reflecting the 
expected differential outcomes when athletic and judgmental abilities 
vary. For example, they would predict different outcomes between a 
high status individual with poor athletic and athletic judgmental 
ability and a high status individual with excellent athletic and 
athletic judgmental ability, the latter being more likely to be 
overestimated, If this had occurred in the present research or if 
athletics.were very important to the groups in terms of values or 
norms, then the author's predictions could have been confounded. 
Person perception theorists, attribution theorists, and perhaps 
consistency theorists would predict more agreement among group 
members on the high status person's performance than on other's 
performances (the lower the status, the less agreement). The 
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author examined this possibility by determining the percent of 
agreement among g.roup members for each member's performance excluding 
the judgment of the individual performing. The status rank of the 
individual was then compared to this agreement percentage rank by 
using Spearman's rank-difference correlation coefficient, and then 
a subsequent t-test (with N-2 df ). Results of high groupness groups 
A and B were not significant, (p :>.05, ta=3.182, tb=l.201, 2-tailed, 
df = 3, 6 respectively). Results concerning low groupness groups N 
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and P were likewise non-significant (t=.573, 1.92, p .C..05, 2 -tailed, 
df= 5,5 respectively). These findings did not support the above 
contention that there would be more agreement among group members on 
the high status person's performance than on other's performances. 
Although these findings did not support this contention, methodological 
weaknesses such as a small number of throws or the questionable 
groupness of the groups may have confounded these results also. 
Impression formation theorists, cognitive consistency theorists, 
and supporters of the Sherifian viewpoint would make approximately 
the same predictions. They would predict that there would be 
overestimation of high status members, underestimation of low status 
members, the magnitude of such varying systematically with groupness, 
and that ther~ would be a negative correlation between the judgmental 
accuracy of the group or nongroup aggregate and the groupness of that 
group or nongroup aggregate. These predictions were not supported. 
It is suggested by the writer that the small number of throws for 
each individual did not provide an adequate sampling of judgmental 
errors. In many cases individuals who were highly overrated on the 
first set of throws were underrated on their second set of throws, 
thus lending some support to this notion. The groupness of the high 
groupness groups may have also been questionable. Although high in 
relation to the low groupness groups, the high groupness groups because 
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of their fraternity affiliation may not as a small group have been 
highly stabilized with respect to roles and statuses. The members 
chosen were a sample of the total fraternity membership and the pledges 
chosen were a sample of the total pledge membership. 
Previous research has supported the idea that in unstructured 
stimulus situations internalized group norms measurably influence an 
individual's judgments which the individual otherwise makes with 
greater objectivity. It has also been shown that these internalized 
group norms operate with measurably less intensity in lower groupness 
groups. The present research did not significantly support these 
previously supported hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2 
Analysis of the magnitude of judgmental errors by groupness 
categories revealed that members of high groupness groups judged more 
accurately than did those of other categories. These findings did 
not support the hypothesis that there is a negative correlation 
between judgmental accuracy and the groupness of a group or,nongroup 
aggregate. Instead, a positive correlation was found between judgmental 
accuracy and the groupness of high and low groupness groups. Findings 
in that same positive direction occurred between the high groupness 
groups and nongroup aggregates. 
Person perception, attribution, and impression formation theorists 
have predicted that there would be greater agreement among high 
groupness groups than low groupness groups as to judgments regarding 
group members' performances. The author examined this possibility 
by determining the percent of agreement among group members for each 
member's performances excluding the judgment of the performer. A 
mean for each group was then calculated. By visual inspection of the 
data there does not appear to be any significant differences and if 
so would be in the direction opposite to that predicted. High 
groupness group A had a mean of .834, group·B, .799, low groupness 
group N, .833, and group P, .860. These findings did not support 
the above prediction. 
The reasoning from attribution theories that higher groupness 
groups would more accurately judge member's performances than lower 
groupness groups was supported. It appears from these results that 
the high status group member may make valid judgments and that the 
group members are influenced by this. Therefore the group's judg-
mental product will be more accurate in higher groupness groups where 
there is greater cons~nsus as to who is the leader or best judger. 
The. Sherifian viewpoint was not entirely supported in the present 
research. However, these findings may still support the idea that 
internal psychological factors within individual members function 
as distorting influences in the patterning of experience in 
judgmental behavior. It is suggested by the writer that the high 
groupness groups were an athletically inclined type placed in a 
judgmental situation where their umpiring skills ~ere being tested 
and then consequently suppressed many distorting influences. This 
coupleo with the idea that the high groupness groups were only 
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high in groupness relative to the other groups and nongroup aggregates 
suggests inherent methodological weaknesses in the selection of groups. 
Findings that high groupness groups are judgmentally more 
accurate than low groupness groups or nongroup aggregates does not 
rule out the possibility that overestimation of high status members 
and underestimation of lower status members may occur. Judgmental 
errors may be systematically related to status regardless of the 
magnitude of errors. 
Although the obtained results did not support the hypotheses, 
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it is the author's contention that inherent methodological difficulties 
confounded the results. The apparatus itself may not have provided 
adequately an unstructured stimulus. Because of only four possible 
alternatives, the structure may be too great. This point is stressed 
because the distance from which individuals make judgment is about 
24 feet. With only four alternatives and a short distance, the 
individual may be provided with a stimulus which is not ambiguous 
enough. The figure presented to the subjects as a representation 
of the target and its scores may also add to this. 
Another possible source of contamination may be the use of ten 
throws by each individual without a warm up period. This may not 
produce an adequate representation of "true" judgments. After 
making judgments, the subjects are instructed to fill out a 
questionnaire. Because of their wish to be through with the 
experiment, many fill out the form inadequately by not reading the 
questions carefully. 
In addition, the analysis used is deficient because of its loss 
of sensitivity. In a high groupness group, it is the author's contention 
that high status members are overrated and low status members under-
rated. By using the present analysis no account is made of these 
two categories alone. The correlations of middle status people 
with judgmental error may be poor, therefore significant correlatipns 
may be buried in the analysis. 
Recommendations for future research in this area would include 
providing a more unstructured stimulus, increasing the judgmental 
distance, providing more alternative responses, the use of a larger 
number of throws, a warm-up period, provisions for insuring proper 
responses to the sociogram, and the use of a different analysis. 
Implications for Future Research 
The use of the sociogame as a method for measuring status and 
groupness has compelling merit for the social sciences. Although 
the present research sociogram did not support hypothesis supported 
by past research, methodological difficulties may have been to 
blame. The development of a simp,le sociogame could replace the 
established sociogames. As shown, previous research has supported 
the view that high status group members will be overestimated, low 
status group members will be underestimated, and the magnitude of 
such varying systematically with groupness. Although previous 
supportive research utilized differing types of sociogames, the 
present sociogame has yet to be established as effective. Estab-
lishing the present sociogame for such would provide advantages to 
the social scientist ·such as portability, durability, ease in 
operability, and objectivity. 
Prior research with the use of sociogames has also shown that 
high groupness groups commit a greater number of errors than low 
groupness groups or nongroup aggregates respectively. However, the 
present research intended to show that high groupness groups commit 
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greater magnitudes or error than low groupness groups or nongroup 
aggregates respectively. The present research attempted to utilize 
more of the available information than previous research by looking 
at both number and magnitude in order to give a more accurate 
representation of group behavior. 
Although the present research did not completely demonstrate 
differences in judgmental accuracy between low groupness groups and 
nongroup aggregates, observations were in the predicted direction. 
Future research may support· the significance of this test . 
.. 
Resume 
A baseball sociogame in which members of high groupness groups 
(H), low groupness groups (L), and nongroup aggregates (N), judged 
their own and others' performances was conducted. The patterns of 
errors analyzed from the judgments were not found to be systematically 
related to group status ranks and groupness. Findings included: 
1. Judgmental rank, produced by the direction and magnitude 
of errors, was found to not be significantly related to the status 
positions in high groupness groups, low groupness groups, or nongroup 
aggregates. 
2. Members of high groupness groups judged more accurately than 
members of low groupness groups. However, high groupness groups 
judged more accurately than nongroup aggregates but not significantly 
more (p <. • 05). 
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Of all the people 











you know anywhere, what one person do you most 
List in order and do not include yourself. 
Considering the question you just answered, do you think the one 
person at the top of your list would also put you at the top of their 
list? 
When you get together with time on_your hands and nothing in 
particular to do, who in the group you are with today has the best 
ideas about what to do and how to do it? List in order and be 












I do not know anyone in this group. 











IF YOU WERE NOT PREVIOUSLY ACQUAINTED WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GROUP 
YOU WERE WITH TODAY, DO NOT ANSWER THE REMAINING QUESTIONS. 
Who is the newest group member? 
-~~~~-~~~~~--~-
How long has he been with the group? 
How much time per week is this group together? -------
How many peopie in your group show up when you do things together? 
Who are they? List and include yourself. 
70 
71 
What activities do you do together? 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
If you had to choose between doing an activity with members of the 
group which threw today or doing an activity with a person or people 
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REIATIONSHIPS BETWEEN JUDGMENTAL RANK 





















RELA.TIONSHIPS BE1WEEN JUDGMENTAL RANK AND 
STATUS IN HIGH AND LOW GROUPNESS GROUPS 
High Groupness Groups (A & B) 
J. Error Status Position (Units - N) 
+116 1.375 
+101 0.000 
+ 85 0.125 
+ 55 1.600 
+ 51 0.750 
+ 45 1.375 
+ 34 0.375 
+ 23 0.200 
+ 23 0.000 
+ 18 2.125 
+ 18 1.400 
+ 15 2.200 
+ 8 0.600 

























16 +100 2 5 
17 + 83 2 6 
23 + 80 1 7 
18 + 69 12 8 
19 + 61 14 9 
24 + 59 16, 10 
25 + 55 1 11 
20 + 43 0 12 
26 + 16 13 13 
27 + 10 1 14 
Nongroup Aggregates (C & D) 
28 +145 NONE BY DEFINITION 1 
29 +132 2 
30 +124 3 
31 +103 4 
32 + 60 5 
33 + 53 6 
34 + 52 7 
35 + 35 8 
36 +123 9 
37 +117 10 
38 + 63 11 
39 + 37 12 
40 + 22 13 
41 + 8 14 
42 + 8 15 
APPENDIX E 
CORREIATIONS (R) BE'IWEEN JUDGMENTAL 
















Correlations (r) Between Judgmental Rank and Status 
80 
APPENDIX F 
JUDGMENTAL ACCURACY BY CATEGORY 
81 
82 
JUDGMENTAL ACCURACY BY CATEGORY 
Category N Total Errors Errors Per 
(Regardless of Sign) Member 
High groupness 13 635 48.85 
Low groupness 14 1190 85.00 
Nongroup 15 1134 75.60 
aggregate 
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